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1 Na¯ga¯rjuna and the Catuskoti
The traditional dominant view in Western philosophy is that truth and falsity are seman-
tic categories that exhaust, without overlap, all (meaningful, declarative) sentences. A
traditional Buddhist view is that, in addition to the Western categories, there may be
(meaningful, declarative) sentences that are neither true nor false, and even some that are
both true and false. So, the Buddhist might recognize four distinct truth values: t, f,b,n.
These four truth values make up the ‘four corners of truth’, or the catuskoti.
Na¯ga¯rjuna, in Mu¯lamadhyamaka¯karika¯ [7], uses the catuskoti positively and negatively.
In the positive use, he argues that for a given proposition all four truth-values hold. In the
negative use, he argues that for a given proposition none of the four truth values hold.
Jay Garfield and Graham Priest [4] attempt to make sense of these apparently paradox-
ical uses of the catuskoti by presenting a series of lattices – orderings on truth-values. The
series of lattices are intended to model the process of awakening. Garfield and Priest are
silent as to whether these lattices will suffice as forming the basis for models of valid in-
ference. But the question is interesting nonetheless. In what follows, I argue that these lat-
tices cannot ground the logic at play in Mu¯lamadhyamaka¯karika¯ (MMK). In §2, I present
Garfield and Priest’s view. In §3, I argue that validity in the given logic is too weak to rep-
resent the arguments made by Na¯ga¯rjuna in MMK. In §4, I argue for a new interpretation
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that places greater emphasis on a suggestion made by Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest in
an earlier paper [3]. The suggestion is that the positive catuskoti requires disambiguation
between the conventional and ultimate perspectives, whereas the negative catuskoti does
not. The result is, I think, a clean interpretation of Na¯ga¯rjuna’s logic.
2 The Garfield/Priest Interpretation
Na¯ga¯rjuna’s positive uses of the catuskoti are primarily intended to undermine the ap-




ti-satya. Conventional reality is the world re-
plete with properties, universals, causation, self, and the like – in other words, the world
as it is usually seen. Na¯ga¯rjuna undermines this picture of reality by arguing that propo-
sitions about this conventional reality have all four truth values.
Everything is real and is not real, both real and not real, neither unreal nor
real. This is the Lord Buddha’s teaching. (MMK, XVIII, 8)
According to Garfield and Priest, the positive catuskoti is best represented by a four-
valued lattice, identical to the one proposed by Dunn for the four-valued semantics for






Table 1: Dunn’s 4-valued FDE
for the logic. We give truth values to all the sentences of our language via an interpretation
function ν such that ν(A) ∈ {t, f,b,n}. We define the behavior of the standard connectives
in the following way.
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• The value of a conjunction, ν(A∧B), is the greatest lower bound of ν(A) and ν(B).
• The value of a disjunction, ν(A∨B), is the least upper bound of ν(A) and ν(B).
• The value of a negation ν(¬A) = ν(A) whenever ν(A) ∈ {b,n}, otherwise it toggles t
and f.
Importantly, the material conditional (A⊃ B) is defined in the standard way as ¬A∨ B .1
This semantics, Garfield and Priest contend, is the correct depiction of the state of the
‘conventional situation’.
A common view is that Na¯ga¯rjuna uses the negative catuskoti in order to underscore
the view that ultimate reality, or parama¯rtha-satya, is fundamentally ineffable. Consider
the application of the negative catuskoti to the proposition that Buddha exists:
We do not assert ‘empty’. We do not assert ‘non-empty’. We neither assert both
nor neither. They are asserted only for the purpose of designation. (MMK,
XXII, 11)
The proposition has none of the four truth values present in the positive catuskoti. So,
Garfield and Priest, following Sylvan, suggest a fifth truth value, e, to represent the tran-
sition to the ultimate perspective – called ‘the great death’ by Jo¯shu. This ordering on
values is not, strictly speaking, a lattice since e is meant to be incomparable to the other
values. How then do sentences receive this value? We introduce a new valuation func-
tion, µ (indicated by the arrows) which maps all values in the set {t, f,b,n} to e. Moreover,
if µ(ν(A)) = e, then µ(ν(¬A)) =µ(ν(A∧B)) =µ(ν(A∨B)) = e. The negative catuskoti utilizes
µ on the positive values to yield the denial of the entire conventional picture.
1Given the truth functions defined by Garfield and Priest, the material conditional is the only candidate
available. With additional resources (e.g. non-normal frame semantics), a basic relevant conditional could
be modeled. For difficulties regarding this approach, see discussion in §3 below. In any case, conditionals




b → e ← n
 ↑ upslope
f
Table 2: the great death
Since truth and falsity are themselves merely part of the conventional picture, the
negative catuskoti is meant to explicitly say the unsayable, to truly say what cannot truly
be said. So, there is a self-undermining paradoxical nature to the negative catuskoti as
well. The next stage of awakening for Na¯ga¯rjuna is the realization that the distinction
between conventional and ultimate reality is itself a convention. This has sometimes been
referred to as ‘the emptiness of emptiness’. But in the above table, µ(e) is undefined, and
so a new ordering must be defined. In the final stage, when one has appreciated the fact
t
upslope ↓ 
b → xe ← n
 ↑ upslope
f
Table 3: the emptiness of emptiness
that distinction between the conventional and the ultimate is itself ‘empty’, the usefulness
of negative catuskoti, and so µ, becomes null. Garfield and Priest represent this as a lattice
with the µ-arrows removed, but with the ‘empty’ value still present. Such is the extent of







Table 4: the awakening
3 Reductio, Modus Ponens, and Validity
If we grant that Garfield and Priest’s view is an accurate model of the stages of awakening,
there is the additional question as to whether their view will serve as a model for valid
inference. It is difficult to get a grasp on just what kind of logical arguments we should
expect from the MMK. One must assume that, given the conventional perspective at least,
the semantics are to be used in the same way as Dunn’s FDE. That is, validity is defined
as designation preservation, where the values t and b are designated. But the movement
from lattice to lattice seems to alter the logic entirely. We must decide whether e is a
designated value or not. One would expect not, since if it were designated, tables 2 and 3
would represent a kind of trivialism – the thesis that every sentence is designated – a view
argued against by Priest [5].2 Moreover, it appears that Na¯ga¯rjuna viewed the negative
catuskoti as a kind of denial, and Priest and Garfield see µ as a kind of ‘external’ negation.3
Hence, one would assume that e is undesignated.
Under these assumptions, it will be useful to consider what argument forms are valid
and invalid in such a logic. In doing so, we will see that the lattices as presented cannot
be extended to a charitable interpretation of the logic in MMK. In what follows, I shall
assume that we should attribute Na¯ga¯rjuna as endorsing valid arguments whenever pos-
2See, in particular, pp. 200–202.
3See the suggestions in [4], §5.
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sible.4 In determining valid inferences for this logic, I will restrict my attention to tables
1 and 2. These tables represent the uses of the positive and negative catuskoti, and hence
are central to the argument in MMK. Moreover, tables 3 and 4 are transitional; Priest and
Garfield claim they are best viewed as dynamic. Hence I focus attention on two perspec-
tives: the conventional, and the ultimate as seen in the ‘great death’.
Let us start with the four-valued lattice and corresponding semantics for FDE. I use
X 
FDE
A to abbreviate the claim that the argument from a set of premises X to a con-





Proof. Let ν(A) = b and ν(B) = f. The least upper bound of b and f is b; so, we have it that
ν(A∨B) = b. Hence, the first premise is designated. If ν(A) = b then ν(¬A) = b, so the second
premise is designated. But ν(B) = f, and hence the conclusion is undesignated.
Since the material conditional is just a disguised disjunction, modus ponens will fail as
well. Given the semantics for FDE, modus ponens is not valid in the framework.
(2) A,A⊃ B 2
FDE
B
Proof. ν(A) = b and ν(B) = f yields a counterexample. Since ν(A) = b, the first premise is
designated. When ν(A) = b, ν(¬A) = b. Since the least upper bound of b and f is b, we have it
that ν(¬A∨B) = b. By definition, ν(A⊃ B) = ν(¬A∨B), so the second premise – ν(A⊃ B) –
is designated. But ν(B) = f, and hence the conclusion is undesignated.
4This assumption may be denied. See the discussion of upa¯ya below.
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The failure of modus ponens is a serious handicap. In fact, modus ponens makes a
frequent appearance in MMK. Consider the following example:
When there is change, there is motion. Since there is change in the moving
[. . . ] motion is in that which is moving. (MMK, II, 2)
Such instances of modus ponens in MMK should give us pause.5 Na¯ga¯rjuna’s preferred
logic ought to make such arguments valid.
We also have a failure of modus tollens in the framework.
(3) A⊃ B ,¬B 2
FDE
¬A
Proof. Let ν(A) = n and ν(B) = b. So, ν(¬A) = n. The least upper bound of n and b is t. Hence,
ν(¬A∨ B) = t; and thus ν(A ⊃ B) = t. So the first premise is designated. Since ν(B) = b,
ν(¬B) = b as well. Hence the second premise is designated. But notice that ν(A) = n, and
so ν(¬A) = n. This means that the conclusion is undesignated.
The failure of modus tollens from the conventional perspective is problematic because,
again, Na¯ga¯rjuna explicitly reasons in accordance with it.
If apart from the cause of form, there were form, form would be without cause.
But nowhere is there an effect without a cause. If apart from form there were
a cause of form, it would be a cause without an effect. But there are no causes
without effects. [. . . ] Form itself without a cause is not possible or tenable.
(MMK IV, 2–5)
This passage is clearly made up of two instances of modus tollens, which again Na¯ga¯rjuna
appears to take as valid.
5For another example, see MMK, V, 4–5
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Further, we also have the failure of hypothetical syllogism:
(4) A⊃ B ,B ⊃C 2
FDE
A⊃C
Proof. Letting ν(A) = t, ν(B) = b and ν(C ) = f yields a counterexample. Since ν(¬A) = f,
the least upper bound of f and b is b. Hence, ν(¬A∨ B) = b; and thus ν(A ⊃ B) = b. So
the first premise is designated. Since ν(B) = b, ν(¬B) = b as well. Since the least upper
bound of b and f is b, ν(¬B ∨C ) = b. Hence the second premise is designated as well. But
notice that ν(¬A) = f and ν(C ) = f, and so ν(¬A∨C ) = c. This means that the conclusion is
undesignated.
MMK is rife with hypothetical syllogism. Indeed, Robinson [6] claims that “the hy-
pothetical syllogism is Na¯ga¯rjuna’s principal form of inference” (196). For example, the
following passage is an instance of hypothetical syllogism:6
Since this action is not arisen from a condition, nor arisen causelessly, it follows
that there is no agent. If there is no action and agent, where could the fruit of
action be? Without a fruit, where is there an experiencer? (MMK XVII, 29–30)
It should be noted that the failure of modus ponens, modus tollens, and hypotheti-
cal syllogism are primarily due to the failures of the material conditional in this context.
Given the truth functions defined by Garfield and Priest, the material conditional is the
only candidate available. We could, however, use the F DE-lattice (with additional re-
sources) as a basis for a relevant conditional. While none of this is explored in Garfield
and Priest, the relevant conditional would solve some of the issues mentioned above.7 For
6The conclusion is implied in what follows.
7Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this response.
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example, a relevant conditional could be constructed to validate modus ponens, modus
tollens, and hypothetical syllogism. A more detailed exploration of this option could
prove productive. One particularly interesting problem with this approach is that it is
difficult to correctly model restricted quantification in relevant logics due to the strength
of the conditional.8 But Na¯ga¯rjuna makes frequent use of restricted quantification of the
problematic sort. For example:
[. . . ] Whatever is deceptive is false. Compounded phenomena are all decep-
tive. Therefore they are all false. (MMK XIII, 1)
In any case, moving to a relevant logic is unnecessary; in §4, I present a simple reinter-
pretation of Garfield and Priest’s lattices which validates all these inferences using the
material conditional.
Even on the relevant conditional semantics for F DE , some conditional-free inferences
(primarily disjunctive syllogism) would still be problematic. Moreover, we still have the
failure of reductio ad absurdum:
(5) A⊃ (B ∧¬B) 2
FDE
¬A
Proof. Let ν(A) = t and ν(B) = b. Then ν(¬B) = b, and since the greatest lower bound of b and
b is b, we have it that ν(B∧¬B) = b. Further, it follows from our supposition that ν(¬A) = f.
Since the least upper bound of b and f is b, we have it that ν(¬A∨ (B ∧¬B)) = b. But that’s
equivalent to (A ⊃ (B ∧ ¬B), and so our premise is designated. But ν(¬A) = f, which is
undesignated. So we have a counterexample.
As Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest [3] note, reductio arguments (in Sanskrit, prasan˙ga)
8For details, and some progress toward a solution see Beall et. al. [1].
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are used throughout MMK. For example, the entirety of MMK V is intended as a reduc-
tio.9 But if, according to the conventional perspective, contradictions are to be tolerated,
in what sense is a reductio ad contradictionem a reductio ad absurdum? Deguchi, Garfield,
and Priest [3] address this question directly. Their response is that while the given argu-
ment form is, strictly speaking, invalid, one can still force one’s opponents to concede a
consequence which by their lights is unacceptable, whether it is contradictory or not. This
may well be so, but it does not appear to save reductio as Na¯ga¯rjuna uses it, unless there
is some independent reason the contradiction’s conclusions are not to be accepted.
It may also be objected that the reductio arguments are not intended to establish the
negation of a proposition, but merely to provide reasons for rejecting that proposition.10
This response, however, would only be successful if one, in the conventional perspective,
could distinguish between rejection and accepting a negation. I tentatively suggest that
this distinction is not present in the conventional perspective, but only arises out of the
transition to the ultimate perspective.11 This seems to be the whole point of the positive
catuskoti.
Are these arguments part of upa¯ya – teachings which are, from the ultimate perspec-
tive, false but useful for a better understanding than the one currently had? If so, one may
wish to endorse a part of the conventional perspective in order to allow it to lead one to
a deeper understanding. Could this be the case with the invalidity of such argument
forms?
Unfortunately, no. This interpretation of Na¯ga¯rjuna would make sense if these argu-
ment forms were valid from the conventional perspective, but invalid from the ultimate
9See in particular [3], p. 4. For another example of reductio, see MMK, VII, 3.
10Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this response.
11For more discussion of this difference, see §4.
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perspective. In that case, these argument forms could be considered upa¯ya; acceptable
for teaching but ultimately to be rejected. But as we have seen, according to Garfield and
Priest’s interpretation, the positive catuskoti makes these argument forms invalid from
the conventional perspective. What’s more, it turns out these forms of argument are valid
from the ultimate perspective. So let us turn to that now.
We have seen that the negative catuskoti amounts to a rejection of all sentences using
µ, our external negation, and a new value e. Let us abbreviate the claim that an argu-
ment from a set of premises X to a conclusion A is valid according to these semantics
thus: X 
e
A. Remember that µ(ν(A)) = e for every atomic A, and whenever µ(ν(A)) = e,
µ(ν(¬A)) =µ(ν(A∧B)) =µ(ν(A∨B)) = e. Thus, any nonempty set of premises X can never
be designated. It follows that every valuation according to which X is designated (there
are none) will be one where a conclusion A is designated. Thus, it turns out that every
argument from nonempty X to A is valid.
(6) X 
e
A for all A and nonempty X .
Notice that this result does not turn on our earlier assumption that e is undesignated. For
if e were designated, then every sentence would be designated, and hence every argument
from X (whether empty or not) to A would be non-vacuously valid.
4 A Proposal
In light of these problems, I want to suggest a gloss on the important work that Garfield
and Priest have done. Indeed, the following proposal is really just a natural extension of
some suggestions that Garfield and Priest have made elsewhere. There are two thoughts
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that led me to the proposed gloss.
The first comes from some textual evidence that the positive catuskoti is fundamen-
tally a tool used by Na¯ga¯rjuna to undermine the conventional perspective; it is not the
conventional perspective itself. If this is right, then the FDE lattice is not the correct ac-
count of conventional truth values.
The second thought comes from suggestions made in Deguchi, Garfield, and Priest [3]
and in Garfield and Priest [4, 8] to the effect that contradictions as applied to conventional
reality are merely prima facie. It is suggested that these contradictions need to be disam-
biguated between the conventional and ultimate perspectives and their distinct notions
of truth.
Thus, something may be true (conventionally), false (ultimately), true and
false (conventionally and ultimately, respectively), and neither true nor false
(ultimately and conventionally, respectively. ([4], 2)
This suggests that the positive catuskoti is really an intermixing of perspectives, and not
constitutive of the conventional perspective itself. There is more evidence that this in-
terpretation of MMK is correct. Garfield and Priest [8] suggest such an interpretation is
supported by the fact that Na¯ga¯rjuna never explicitly endorses a contradiction at the level
of conventional reality. Second, as we have already noted, Na¯ga¯rjuna takes reductio ar-
guments to be decisive against his opponents. As such, it seems he cannot be committed
to the possible truth of contradictions in the conventional picture.
Following these two lines of thought, I propose we revise the Garfield/Priest inter-
pretation by starting with an alternative lattice. In this lattice, truth values reflect both
perspectives; they are ordered pairs of the values 1,0, where 1 represents ‘yes’ and 0
represents ‘no’. The first member of the pair reflects the answer to the question “Is it
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conventionally true?”; the second member of the pair reflects the answer to the question
“Is it ultimately false”?. There are four possibilities: 〈1,1〉, 〈1,0〉, 〈0,1〉, 〈0,0〉. Intuitively,
ν(A) = 〈1,1〉 when A is both conventionally true and ultimately false; ν(A) = 〈1,0〉 when
A is conventionally true and ultimately not false; ν(A) = 〈0,1〉 when A is conventionally
not true and ultimately false, and ν(A) = 〈0,0〉 when A is neither conventionally true nor
ultimately false.







We include semantics for the connectives as follows.
• The value of a conjunction, ν(A∧B), is the greatest lower bound of ν(A) and ν(B).
• The value of a disjunction, ν(A∨B), is the least upper bound of ν(A) and ν(B).
• Where ν(A) = 〈x, y〉, the value of the negation ν(¬A) = 〈1− x, 1− y〉.
The only significant change from the Dunn semantics above is the treatment of nega-
tion. Here, negation toggles 〈1,0〉 and 〈0,1〉 similar to the Dunn semantics, but also tog-
gles 〈1,1〉, 〈0,0〉. This reflects the suggestion emphasized by Garfield and Priest [4, 8] that
Na¯ga¯rjuna never explicitly endorses contradictions from the conventional perspectives.
According to our semantics for negation, a proposition and its negation may never both
be conventionally true.
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To fully explicate the logic, we need to specify designated values and consequence.
Since the primary purpose of the positive catuskoti is to adopt the conventional perspec-
tive (if only to undermine it) we take conventional truth as designated. That means that
any truth value which has 1 as its first member should be designated, otherwise not. So,
〈1,1〉 and 〈1,0〉 are designated values. On this semantics, we define conventional validity
(
B4) in the usual designation-preserving way: an argument from X to A is conventionally
valid (X 
B4 A) iff whenever ν(x) is designated for all x in X , so too is ν(A) designated.
It is important to notice that the B4 semantics for the connectives on this lattice gener-
ates a fully classical propositional logic, according to which disjunctive syllogism, modus
ponens, modus tollens, hypothetical syllogism, and reductio are all valid. More specif-
ically, these semantics are a four-valued Boolean algebra, and hence validate all the same
inferences as is two-valued counterpart – the standard classical semantics.12 Thus, from
the conventional perspective, Na¯ga¯rjuna has all the classical inference principles at his
disposal, because they are indeed valid. The positive catuskoti, the four corners of truth,
arise when we move between perspectives. The clash of perspectives generates the four-
values necessary for the positive catuskoti.
It is worth noting that we have not yet discussed the relation between ‘true’ and ‘not
false’, nor the relation between ‘false’ and ‘not true’. It is plausible to assume that from the
conventional perspective, being false is equivalent to being not true. The distinction be-
tween ‘false’ and ‘not true’ is, in part, what is supposed to result from attending carefully
to the positive uses of the catuskoti. So, in short, a 1 in the first argument place of a truth
value denotes conventional truth and a 0 in the first argument place denotes conventional
falsity (which is just to say conventional untruth). Of course, from the conventional per-
12For proof of this fact, see Beall and Van Fraassen’s [2] discussion of the liberal B4 matrix, §11.4, pp.
169–172.
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spective, the above semantics dictates that a proposition and its negation are never both
conventionally not true. But this is to be expected, if falsity is conventionally identical to
untruth. The result is that a proposition and its negation may never be both convention-
ally untrue because they may never both be conventionally false. This is simply because
conventionally (i.e. classically) the falsity of A implies the truth of ¬A, and the falsity of ¬A
implies the truth of A. In other words, if we allowed conventionally false contradictions,
we would be forced to accept conventionally true ones.
On the other hand, from the ultimate perspective, the negative catuskoti teaches us
that being not false is not the same as being true. What the positive catuskoti adds to the
conventional perspective is the possibility of rejecting or denying propositions and their
negations. So, in an important way, our truth values build an external negation into the
ultimate perspective. Since a 1 in the second place denotes ‘not ultimately false’ this need
not imply that anything is ultimately true. Taking this external negation seriously moves
us from positive catuskoti to negative catuskoti, as understood by Garfield and Priest,
since the attitude there is rejection all the way down. It may be objected, that the above
semantics appears to imply that no proposition and its negation may both be ultimately
not false.13 Here, I think, it is important to see that the above semantics is useful only for
positive uses of the catuskoti. Negative uses are best understood via Garfield and Priest’s
µ valuation function and the value e.
In summary, Garfield and Priest’s series of lattices are best understood as models of
the stages of awakening, but do not give adequate models for valid inference. In order to
extend their account to valid inference, one must see that pure conventional reality only
includes two truth values, t and f, and that Na¯ga¯rjuna’s logic is entirely classical. The pos-
13Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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itive catuskoti utilizes ambiguity between the conventional and ultimate perspectives, as
outlined using the B4 semantics. The logic here is still fully classical. Once the transition is
made to negative uses of the catuskoti, we employ a new valuation function µ and a new
semantic value e corresponding to ‘emptiness’. This leads us directly to the full ultimate
perspective.14
14Thanks to Joel Kupperman, Graham Priest, Jay Garfield, and two anonymous referees for suggestions
and discussions that led to many improvements in this paper.
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